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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THE MODERN MELIAN DIALOGUE

BY

COLONEL WILLIAM H. PARRY, III
United States Army

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COL William H. Parry, III United States Army

> Robert C. Coon Project Advisor

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ABSTRACT

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William H. Parry, III

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Thucydides included the *Melian Dialogue* as part of his epic, <u>The Peloponnesian War</u>. Historians doubt the speeches between the Athenian generals and the Council of the Melians ever took place as written, but its substance has become a classic excerpt in the "Realist" versus "Idealist" debate over international relations. Its timeless treatment of national interests, balance of power, alliances, and the nature of leadership make it as relevant today as when it was written in 416 BC. It has been 10 years since the end of the Cold War, and the United States is still seeking to define a suitable, feasible, and acceptable national strategy to fit the geostrategic environment of the early 21st century. For over 40 years, NSC-68 established the requirements for an all-encompassing national strategy – political, economic, military, and informational – designed to contain communist expansion.

Alliances and coalitions played a major role in successfully executing containment, but now that the Cold War is over, what are the roles the United States wants them to play? It is current national policy that when it is advantageous, the U.S. must always be prepared to act alone. However, it is also stated policy that the U.S. can only achieve many of its security objectives through alliances and other formal military structures. Today, the efficacy of multinational alliances in executing Operations Other Than War is dubious at best, and the U.S. military finds itself drawn into increasingly smaller scale contingency operations where vital national interests are not at stake. The resulting Operations and Personnel tempo are taking a toll on the force. Assuming that it is prudent for the U.S. to remain engaged in regions of political, economic, and military importance, this paper addresses the following question: what is the contribution of multinational alliances and coalitions in securing important United States national security objectives in the next fifteen year period?

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MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THE MODERN MELIAN DIALOGUE

The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.

Thucydides, from the *Melian Dialogue*,
The Peloponnesian War¹

For the past ten years, national foreign policy decision-makers have grappled with a strategic decision point attempting to codify the Nation's role in a dramatically changed international geopolitical landscape. The challenges today are certainly as significant as those that underpinned the strategic decisions the United States faced in April 1950. At that time, policy makers had to choose between returning to a pre-World War II strategy of quasi-isolationism or restricting the Soviets from further extending their sphere of influence into western Europe and the Near East. They decided on the latter course, and for over 40 years, "containing" the Soviet Union dictated the ends, ways, and means of U.S. national policy. To weaker nations in the western sphere of influence, the United States extended a mutual defense guarantee to check Soviet aggression and expansionism. The "grand strategy" document that established the *raison d'être* for U.S Cold War policy was NSC-68, *United States Objectives and Programs for National Security.*

NSC-68 elucidated the significant geopolitical changes of the first half of the 20th century: two world wars, the collapse of five empires, and a fundamental alteration in the international balance of power. The essential element of a global containment strategy was a series of alliances, based on mutual defense treaties. NSC-68 provided a comprehensive threat-based assessment that stipulated the value of alliances along the rim of the Soviet Union and China. Fifty years later, the requirement for alliances in this changed environment is the subject of frequent debate.

As Cold War "victor" and the only legitimate remaining superpower, what role should alliances and coalitions play in future U.S. foreign policy? This study will examine that question in detail. As the 21st century begins, no nation strategically threatens U.S. vital interests. However, the United States continues to cling to its Cold War alliance structures and concepts while confronting an entirely different set of challenges. The results have been mixed at best, and in some cases disastrous. Therefore, it is imperative that United States policy makers rigorously analyze the geo-strategic environment, the national interests, and the threats to those interests during this period when no peer competitor exists. Without a clearly defined enemy, articulating a meaningful endstate will be difficult. It would be reprehensible however, if the U.S. fails to decisively shape the course of events for the next fifteen years, and in the process finds itself confronting an opponent that threatens the nation's survival.

The purpose of this study is to examine the potential roles for multinational operations in formulating a national security strategy that seeks to avoid major confrontation. Absent an ideologically

opposite threat, two critical aspects of the analysis are the post-Cold War evolution of mutual defense alliances and how well multinational operations fit a standard model for strategy formulation. The emerging dialectic between the modern realist and idealist dialogues is equally as clear as that which Thucydides described on the Island of Melos in 416 BC. At that time, the Athenians narrowed their rationale to the hard realism of the strategic situation facing the neutral Melians (a Spartan colony) in an attempt to convince them why they should join the Hellenistic alliance. The idealistic Melians' refusal to accept the appraisal facing them, in the form of the Athenian ultimatum, resulted in disaster. The "Melian Dialogue" is a timeless treatise on the balance of power, alliances, leadership, and national interests. The modern corollary is whether U.S. policy makers will accept the hard truths about the efficacy of multinational operations that are emerging from the new strategic environment. While post-Cold War military operations have spanned the entire conflict spectrum, the norm has shifted more towards Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The results have not been promising, causing further strains in the dialogue over the nation's ability to execute a national strategy of engagement successfully.

TERMINOLOGY AND THE CHANGING PATTERN OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean as we are now at liberty to do it.

— George Washington's Farewell Address 17 September 1796, Philadelphia, PA²

Precise terminology facilitates defining the ends of a coherent national strategy. While the terms alliance and coalition are often used interchangeably, they satisfy a different set of objectives which in turn, drive different requirements. Therefore, the first step is to define these terms clearly for use in further discussions.

Coalitions and alliances are sub-sets of multinational operations, a collective term that describes military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations. An alliance is "the result of formal agreements (i.e. treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long term objectives which further the common interest of the members." Conversely, "coalition actions are outside the boundary of established alliances, usually for a single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest." In current U.S. Joint doctrine, multinational operations are "also known as allied, alliance, bilateral, multilateral or coalition as appropriate."

Examples of current alliances in which the U.S. actively participates include the NATO multilateral alliance (based on the 4 April 1949 Washington Treaty) and bilateral alliances with South Korea and Japan. The alliance with Korea established the Combined Forces Command (CFC), and is codified in the 1 October 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan (January 1960) governs that bilateral arrangement. The principal distinguishing feature of these alliances is their basis in formal, mutual defense treaties that in the case of an attack bind the signatories to a collective military response.

If a situation warrants a multinational military response, but no alliance exists, a coalition of nations with similar interests is a feasible alternative to resolve the problem. An example of a recent coalition in which the U.S. participated is the 38-nation ad hoc arrangement established for the single occasion of Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Lacking a mutual defense treaty, the U.S.-led coalition broadly operated under the auspices of United Nations Security Council Resolutions that demanded the immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Because of cultural, religious, and political reasons, the United States lacks a formal alliance in Southwest Asia. However, the U.S. executes foreign policy in the region through a series of executive agreements with the six member nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, and Syria (GCC+2). As an example, immediately following the Gulf War, these eight nations pledged in the 1991 Damascus Declaration to collectively work together to enhance their common defense capabilities to defend the region.⁶

As a general pattern, Cold War foreign policy and the accompanying constructs for alliances and coalitions lack sufficient flexibility for the current security environment. Alliances typically have a larger scope, yet tend to focus exclusively on military deterrence and the commitment of military forces, if required, to defeat a direct attack by an aggressor against one of the parties. Due to the ad hoc nature of coalitions, the amount of time available tends to limit coalition objectives, and thus constrain their long-term strategic effectiveness.

The majority of current conflicts lie in regions on the periphery of existing U.S. alliances, and military involvement is generally limited to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Alliances designed specifically for warfighting find themselves in a quandary. The situation in the Balkans offers an excellent example. The NATO Alliance responded slowly in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo – constrained by the absence of a direct attack against one of its members in the region. Additionally, there were a number of non-NATO nations who claimed interests (political, ethnic, religious, historical) in the outcome. Differing visions of the strategic endstate in the region, coupled with a potentially long time horizon, continue to plague efforts to forge an effective multinational coalition to resolve the problem. Additionally, a new dynamic has emerged in MOOTW with the presence of large numbers of non-state actors (specifically Non-Government Organizations and International Organizations) with interests in the eventual outcome. Their role and status makes it difficult to apply the precise definitions cited previously.




FIGURE 1. A CHANGING PATTERN OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Figure 1 depicts this problem graphically. It is a safe assumption that near-term military operations will continue to fall into this same pattern.

THE STRATEGY PROCESS MODEL: A TEST FOR CONTINUITY

To accomplish its national objectives for the past 50 years, the United States has actively participated in alliances, coalitions, and military operations that can be categorized somewhere between the two. However, participation by U.S. armed forces in multinational operations is not an exclusive military end in itself. Alliances and coalitions are extensions of foreign policy. Therefore, an effective military strategy must be based around the important tenets of national policy and be totally consistent and supportive of the national security strategy. Future U.S. foreign policy must dictate the function and structure of U.S. participation in future multinational operations.

Multinational military operations are only one small aspect of overall foreign policy. However, commitment of armed forces is generally the ultimate and extreme indicator of how far the nation is willing to go to protect its national interests. Therefore, the foundation for those actions depends on the clear articulation of national interests. Figure 2 depicts the model for strategy formulation used in instruction at the Army War College.




FIGURE 2. GUIDELINES FOR STRATEGY FORMULATION 7

One test of the validity of the model is the degree of continuity between the statement of national values and a coherent military strategy. At this point, it is not important to agree with the premises of the model. What is important is whether there is continuity in the thought process. More specifically, in terms of multinational operations, it is important how well the relevant documents that articulate the national security strategy reflect that continuity.

The national values of the United States have remained generally consistent for over 200 years and derive directly from the Constitution and Declaration of Independence. These documents articulate the importance of democratic liberties and the rule of law. These values, in turn, form the basis for U.S. national interests. The 1998 National Security Strategy lists these core interests as:

- Protect the lives and safety of Americans.
- Maintain the sovereignty of the United States with its values, institutions, and territory intact.
- Promote the prosperity and well being of the nation and its people.
- Achieve a favorable world order.⁸

The fourth national interest (achieve a favorable world order) articulates the basis for U.S. participation in multinational operations within a strategy of global engagement. Policy makers then categorize interests by intensity - vital, important, and peripheral.

The concept of Shape-Respond-Prepare is central to the 1998 National Security Strategy (NSS). Ideally, the strategy formulation process should examine national values, interests, and policies against the backdrop of a strategic appraisal from a U.S. perspective to ultimately shape the resulting NSS. The strategic appraisal step examines and identifies the trends, challenges, and threats to national interests. The current appraisal highlights the emergence of globalization, rogue states/ethnic conflict, and asymmetric threats over the past 10 years. Policy makers use this appraisal to frame general guidelines that set the foundation for U.S. national security strategy. The strategy formulation process produces national policies that capture the essence of U.S. leadership and engagement throughout the world. A nation that ascribes to global leadership must also possess the capability and willingness to use all elements of national power to influence the actions of other nations and non-state actors.

Global engagement is the circumscribing theme in current U.S. security strategy. While it is a clear statement of national policy, technically derived from national interests, it is also a source of friction when employing the military element of power. The NSS highlights the importance of shaping the international environment while simultaneously retaining the ability to respond with some or all elements of national power to crises that threaten U.S. national interests. Within this response capability, decision-makers have essentially two courses of action. The NSS states the U.S. must be "prepared to act alone when that is our most advantageous course; however, many security objectives are best achieved – or can only be achieved through alliances or other formal security structures or as leader of an ad hoc coalition."

Output

Description:

Global engagement frames the basis for the use of the military element of power in several key Department of Defense documents that collectively support the national military strategy. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) contains numerous statements regarding U.S. propensity towards alliance and coalition military operations. The QDR ties together multinational operations and shaping the international environment, emphasizing "in regions where the United States has vital and important interests, the U.S. military helps bolster the security of key allies and friends and works to adapt and strengthen core alliances and coalitions." Further, recognizing the demand for U.S. participation in smaller scale contingencies (SSC) over the next 15 years, these operations place "a premium on the ability of the U.S. military to work effectively with... a variety of coalition partners."

The 1997 National Military Strategy (NMS) discusses multinational operations extensively within the context of shaping the international environment. Through engagement, armed forces "promote regional stability, increase the security of allies and friends, build coalitions, and ensure a more secure global environment." The NMS also cites international exercises as demonstrating "our ability to form and lead effective coalitions." Beyond SSCs, it cautions that if the U.S. were unable to deter and defeat adversaries in Major Theater Wars (MTWs), it would "signal to key allies our inability to help defend mutual interests, thus weakening our alliances and coalitions."

In short, the current administration has placed a premium on the ability of U.S. armed forces to participate in multinational operations to support a national policy and strategy of global engagement. With the reduction of forward-deployed forces, particularly in Korea and Western Europe in the early 1990's, reliance upon alliances and coalitions is critical to the ability of the United States to accomplish its national security objectives on a regional basis. Given an uncertain strategic environment, there is a high degree of consistency and continuity regarding the utility of multinational operations. Figure 3 depicts the national strategy formulation model reflecting citations as they apply to multinational operations from the preceding references.

NATIONAL VALUES



NATIONAL INTERESTS



STRATEGIC APPRAISAL



NATIONAL POLICY



NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY



NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

- · LIBERTY OF SPEECH, PRESS, AND RELIGION.
- EQUALITY OF CONDITION AND OUTCOME
- ACHIEVEMENT
- JUSTICE
- PRECEDENT: PAST DECISIONS SHOULD BE FOLLOWED IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES
- RULE OF LAW: RULERS AND RULED ARE ANSWERABLE TO THE LAW
- SECURITY OF ONE'S OWN PRIVATE PROPERTY
- PRIMACY OF LOCALISM
- DEMOCRACY 15
- PROTECT THE LIVES AND SAFETY OF AMERICANS
- MAINTAIN THE SOVEREIGNITY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH ITS VALUES, INSTITUTIONS AND TERITORY INTACT
- PROMOTE THE PROSPERITY AND WELL-BEING OF THE NATION AND ITS PEOPLE
- ACHIEVE A FAVORABLE WORLD ORDER 16
- GLOBALIZATION ACCELERATING ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION; AFFECTED BY EVENTS BEYOND OUR BORDERS.
- OUTLAW STATES AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS
- WMD, TERRORISM, DRUG TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME THREATS
- RESOURCE DEPLETION, RAPID POPULATION GROWTH, ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, NEW INFECTIOUS DISEASES, UNCONTROLLED REFUGEE MIGRATION. 17
- AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AND ENGAGEMENT IN THE WORLD ARE VITAL FOR OUR SECURITY.
- WE MUST LEAD ABROAD IF WE ARE TO BE SECURE AT HOME
- WE MUST BE PREPARED AND WILLING TO USE ALL APPROPRIATE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER TO INFLUENCE THE ACTIONS OF OTHER STATES AND NON-STATE ACTORS. ¹⁸
- SHAPE THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
- RESPOND TO THREATS AND CRISES
- PREPARE NOW FOR AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
- PREPARED TO ACT ALONE WHEN THAT IS OUR MOST ADVANTAGEOUS COURSE; HOWEVER, MANY SECURITY OBJECTIVES ARE BEST ACHIEVED - OR CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED - THROUGH ALLIANCES OR OTHER FORMAL SECURITY STRUCTURES OR AS A LEADER OF AN AD HOC COALTION 19
- NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES: PROMOTE PEACE & STABILITY/ WHEN NECESSARY, DEFEAT ADVERSARIES
- STRATEGIC CONCEPTS: STRATEGIC AGILITY/OVERSEAS PRESENCE/POWER PROJECTION/DECISIVE FORCE
- MILITARY RESOURCES: A JOINT FORCE 4 ACTIVE ARMY CORPS W/10 ACTIVE DIVS/2 ACRs & 15 ARNG eSB; 12 CVBG/ARG, 11 AIRWINGS, 116 SURFACE COMBATANTS, 50 SSN; 12 ACTIVE FIGHTER WING EQUIVALENTS; 3 DIV-SIZED MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 20

FIGURE 3. MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

To keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.

— Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay NATO Secretary General 1952-57 on the purpose of NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the United States' most enduring and comprehensive mutual security alliance, celebrating its 50th anniversary last year. It is one of many multilateral alliances the U.S. employed during the 1950's and 60's to contain Soviet expansionism on the Eurasian landmass. World War II decimated the European continent and compounded the difficulties America's allies faced with the security and economic implications of returning to a peacetime economy. Germany's defeat resulted in a European balance of power problem, and no single Western nation appeared capable of keeping Stalin from continuing to further his gains. The problem confronting the United States was a combined economic, political, and military one. No single element of power could produce a suitable, feasible, and acceptable solution. Consequently, alliances played a significant role in the approach the United States adopted.

In pursuit of a strategy of containment on a global basis, for example, in September 1947 the U.S. joined 18 Western Hemisphere nations in signing the Rio Treaty pledging mutual defense and assistance against external aggression. This treaty would lead the following year to the founding of the Organization of American States (OAS). In his 1948 inaugural address, President Truman established a "Four Point" U.S. security strategy for the post-World War II strategic environment. The points were: support of the United Nations, continuation of the Marshall Plan, collective defense against communist aggression, and aid to underdeveloped countries. 21 This fourth point achieved the solely economic aspects of containment in Asia, Africa, and Latin America without committing the United States to mutual defense agreements. That same year, a communist-sponsored coup d'etat toppled Czechoslovakia and the Soviets blockaded Berlin. In the Far East, Mao Zhedung dispatched the Chinese Nationalist government with amazing swiftness followed closely by the Soviet detonation of a nuclear device - many years earlier than expected. Perceiving the requirement to strengthen ties and establish a common defense to resist Soviet ideological, political, and military threats, five European nations (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the U.K.) signed the Brussels Treaty (the founding document of today's WEU,) in March 1948. The addition of the United States and Canada in April 1949 solidified the Trans-Atlantic link and security guarantee. 22 Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal were invited to join this North Atlantic Alliance. On 4 April 1949, these 12 allies signed the Treaty of Washington, which became the founding document for NATO. Later, Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain would bring the alliance to its Cold War strength of 16 nations. ²³ In response to Germany's rearmament and integration into NATO in 1955, the Soviet Union created the Warsaw Pact.

The start of the Korean War (certainly encouraged, if not precipitated by the Soviet Union 24) in June 1950 triggered the U.S. to adopt NSC-68. It appeared, based on both events in Korea and Mao's takeover in China, the new communist threat was spreading eastward in Asia. In January 1950, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as the only legal government of the country. Immediately, the Soviet Union and China recognized this government. The United States countered by recognizing Emperor Bao Dai as the head of state in Vietnam, setting the stage for 25 years of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. In response to this series of events, the United States expanded the policy of containment to the Far East. In July 1951, the Colombo Plan for Cooperation and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific led to the formation of the ANZUS Mutual Defense pact between the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand. In 1952, Dwight Eisenhower (NATO's first Supreme Commander) replaced Truman as President and continued the policy of containment, while increasing the importance of a U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability. On 1 January 1955, the United States joined seven other nations (Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan) in forming the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The aim of this alliance was to provide defense and economic cooperation in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific area, and combat communist aggression in Indochina. Unlike NATO, the SEATO alliance did not obligate a member to respond to an attack against one of its members. However, several SEATO signatories sent troops to fight in Vietnam, and the alliance sanctioned the eventual U.S. military effort there. After France and Pakistan officially withdrew from the alliance in 1967 and 1972 respectively, and the U.S. ceased operations in Vietnam in 1975, the alliance served no purpose; by mutual consent, it disbanded in June 1977.

The Korean War ended with the signing of an armistice on 27 July 1953, and the U.S. entered into a bilateral mutual defense treaty with the Republic of Korea. This treaty facilitated the stationing of Army and Air Forces on the Korean peninsula, and led to the eventual establishment of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) unified command structure. While the number of U.S. forward-deployed forces has fluctuated since the treaty's inception, the lack of a formal peace treaty terminating the Korean War continues to dictate a long-term physical commitment in Korea. U.S. presence also serves to check North Korean ambitions to forcefully unify the country, or attempt to establish a degree of regional hegemony.

In February 1955, Iraq and Turkey signed the mutual security Baghdad Pact. The following year, Great Britain, Iran, and Pakistan joined the alliance creating the Middle East Treaty Organization. In 1959, the name changed to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) when Iraq withdrew from the bilateral Baghdad Pact. CENTO was a mutual defense and security organization whose objectives were to provide joint defense against possible aggressors and encourage economic and scientific development between its members. Although not an official member of CENTO, the U.S. actively supported the organization. With Turkey's membership in both NATO and CENTO and Pakistan belonging to both CENTO and SEATO, using a series of alliances, the United States had completely contained the Soviet and Chinese communists from Western Europe to Southeast Asia. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution

in Iran, the new Iranian regime withdrew from CENTO; Pakistan, claiming the alliance had no meaning without Iran withdrew, rendering the CENTO alliance defunct.

The Suez Crisis in October 1956 provided President Eisenhower an opportunity to demonstrate U.S. resolve to counter Soviet overtures in the Middle East. When Egyptian President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, the U.K., France, and Israel responded with military forces. While Eisenhower publicly rebuked his allies for their action, he pledged the U.S. would use force to prevent communist regimes from coming to power in this critical region.

In January 1960, the United States established a bilateral alliance with Japan in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. This agreement is central to the stationing of U.S. reinforcements in the event of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. A permanent forward presence in Japan facilitates maintaining a credible Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) capability to respond to any military crisis in the Far East/Northeast Asia. In addition, it effectively assuages any possible fears of a militarily resurgent Japan.

The following map depicts the areas where the U.S. entered alliances and executed influence to stop the spread of communism during the early years of the Cold War.




FIGURE 4. COLD WAR ALLIANCES, 1945-1960 26

As George Kennan predicted in his 1947 "X" article, the seeds of its own decay eventually brought down the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. In the five years from 1987 to 1991, the threat of a Soviet attack against the United States and its allies virtually disappeared. Beginning with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty followed by Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, Solidarity's rise to power in Poland, the fall of the Berlin Wall and German reunification, and

political and economic crises sparking change in the Kremlin itself, the basic threat that underpinned NSC-68 – a Soviet military attack – was gone.

attempt to establish hegemony over the Middle East, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The Carter Doctrine of the early 1970s explicitly stated that access to Middle East oil was a vital security interest of the United States. This implied that any direct threat to that interest constituted sufficient grounds for the U.S. to go to war. Lacking an existing mutual defense agreement or alliance in the region, the United States found itself as the leader of an ad hoc coalition of 38 nations, all with varying degrees of interests and capabilities to respond. While the immediate threat was dispatched via military action, it is doubtful whether the Desert Storm coalition would have sustained itself much longer. Ten years later, the United States continues to "contain" Saddam Hussein with economic sanctions, military deployments, and "over the horizon" forces. However, no Middle East mutual defense alliance with the United States was ever established.

From these historical examples, a model (Figure 5) for the essential elements of successful mutual defense alliances in the past can be constructed.




FIGURE 5. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AN ALLIANCE/COALITION

One test for the modern sufficiency of this model is to examine recent military operations in order to determine the effectiveness of the different elements of the model. Operation Noble Anvil in Kosovo provides an excellent case study. While a United States-led alliance (NATO) principally controls Noble Anvil, participation by non-member nations gives this operation the flavor of a coalition.

The contemporary roots of the Kosovo problem began in 1974, when Tito's new Yuqoslavian constitution granted Kosovo autonomy within greater Serbia. Ethnic Albanians, who made up an overwhelming percentage of the population in Kosovo, launched riots in 1981, demanding full status as a Yugoslav republic. This set off a significant northward exodus of Serbians. In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic became the unchallenged leader of Serbia. He immediately inflamed Serbian passions by citing (with great historical license) the loss of the Kingdom of Serbia and the slaughter of the Serbian knights by the Ottoman Turks at the Field of Blackbirds in 1389. In 1989, Milosevic stripped Kosovo of her autonomy. and a group of Kosovars, fearing Serbian retribution, split off to form the Kosovo Liberation Army. As part of the November 1995 Dayton Accords ending the war in Bosnia, the European Union recognized the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia (including Kosovo) and Montenegro. In 1997, in the wake of Albania's economic implosion brought on by an investment pyramid scheme gone awry, law and order in Kosovo completely broke down. Insurgent acts by the KLA against Serbian police only evoked violent responses from the Serb government. In the summer of 1998, the Serbian army struck with a vengeance against the growing ranks of the KLA and began a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing and destruction of Kosovar villages. Hundreds of thousands of civilians fled for their lives creating a significant refugee crisis. NATO, fearing possible escalation and widening of this civil war to Macedonia, Greece, or Turkey, attempted to broker a political settlement in the Rambouillet accords. The KLA reluctantly agreed to them, but Milosevic flatly refused to comply with several of the terms including restoring Kosovo's autonomy (short of full independence). Serbian police and military forces continued their offensive, and despite a significant diplomatic effort, Milosevic refused to back down. After months of threats of the use of force, on 24 March 1999, NATO initiated the U.S.-led 78-day bombing campaign.

The community of nations felt compelled to do something in Kosovo, satisfying the foundation of the model - shared security interests and a credible threat to those interests. What is interesting is the method that community, specifically the NATO alliance chose. Enhancing stability and security in Europe in the post-Cold War era is an important interest for NATO. There is good reason to believe that the inability of the European Union to respond quickly and effectively in Bosnia is key to the response in Kosovo. Another factor is that NATO's charter specifically authorizes military action under only two circumstances: a direct attack against one of its members (Article 5) or when mandated by the United Nations Security Council (Article 7). The situation in Kosovo technically satisfied neither of these conditions. The turbulent situation in the Balkans – with its unique fusion between Europe and Asia, and its reputation as a region in turmoil for the entire 20th century – clearly threatens European stability. However, Kosovo lies outside NATO's "comfort zone" for crisis response.

There were also significant differences in the objectives of NATO's response to Milosevic's actions. President Clinton stated the bombing was intended to "demonstrate NATO's opposition to aggression, deter further attacks on civilians, and if necessary damage Serbia's capacity to make war." However, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana "suggested that Serbia was being punished for its refusal to accept a settlement in Kosovo and let NATO police it." Two weeks later, NATO expanded its goals to

include a multi-ethnic Kosovo, withdrawal of the Serbs and an end to Serbian aggression against the Kosovars, guarantees for the quick and safe return of displaced refugees, and a NATO-led international military presence to enforce a peace agreement.²⁹ Even in their expanded form, NATO's objectives were still not totally congruent with those stated by the United States.

Another interesting factor is the reaction by individual NATO nations over the Alliance's response, specifically those most affected in the Southern Region. Italy, traditional friends of the Serbs, refused to let its planes participate in the bombing, although it did provide airbases for the attacks. Greece, faced with the possibility of absorbing the brunt of a potential spillover of the conflict, logistically supported NATO surveillance flights. However, the Greeks and Serbs have Orthodox religious ties, and the Greek media is "unabashedly" pro-Serb. Spain provided four F-18s and allowed overflight/basing rights for enroute U.S. aircraft. A month into the bombing, less than half of the Spaniards polled approved of the response. France, always the most eclectic member of NATO, generally approved of NATO's response, but the political debate was marred by far right rhetoric charging that Gaullist president Chirac was acting like Clinton's "lapdog," by communist claims that the war was a "blood idiocy," and by Gaullist denunciation of NATO as a "tool of America." Despite the rhetoric of the European allies, their ongoing participation in the operation validates the importance of the model's economic and political elements.

One manifestation of potential fissures within the Alliance occurred at the conclusion of the bombing campaign. LTG Michael Jackson, Commander of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) refused an order from the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark, to deploy NATO military forces to prevent Russian forces from securing the airfield at Pristina. In this widely publicized event, Jackson stated that it was "not worth starting a world war with the Russians," and that he would discuss the order with the British Commander. Jackson's decision stood and became the genesis of much discussion and innuendo in the United States about the suitability of NATO's integrated command structure and procedures for MOOTW. A critical element of the model is a unified command and control structure that facilitates alliance operations. NATO's most pressing modification in light of this new strategic environment must be its military and political decision making apparatus.

In the final analysis, the Western European Union (WEU) which is the military arm of the EU, lacks the military resources and resolve to deal quickly with regional problems like Milosevic. The WEU must collectively fix this problem if it intends to fulfill the European Security and Defense Identity (EDSI) and function as NATO's European military pillar. When it comes to NATO's military leadership, the same is true for any of the individual European nations of the NATO alliance. Despite the EU's impressive economic potential, one European analyst notes "the difference between being hit by a British or German Tornado and an American F-16 is critical. Behind those Tornados stand but medium powers; behind the U.S. Air Force plane in the Balkan skies stands a superpower that can hurl all the ordnance in the world without having to expose itself to counterfire."

For the near to mid-term, NATO needs the United States. Russia may be down and out today, but in strictly European realism, its "track record" has not been stable or consistent with that of a responsible great power. United States armed forces provide a significant value-added capability to regional security in Europe. Serving as a counterweight to a possible resurgent Germany or Russia, the U.S. reassures those NATO members who have a vivid recollection of what can happen when the U.S. is not a part of the balance of power in Europe. Without NATO, the combined effects of German unification coupled with the Soviet collapse had the potential to increase British and French concerns. The U.S. is indispensable insurance against the return of German nationalism. Tord Ismay's 50 year-old "dictum" cited at the beginning of this section remains relevant for NATO today, more for political, than self-defense reasons. In strict terms of its initial role as a security alliance, past and future trends are clear. While NATO provides an outlet for legitimacy in attempts to solve regional problems, without U.S. military preponderance and resolve, the pinnacle of the model at Figure 5, the Alliance is merely a "paper tiger." Kosovo is but the latest in a string of examples where an alliance, grappling with the strategic endsmeans dialectic, has difficulty with a coherent response to an ambiguous threat.

Given this, there is a degree of substantiation to the charge that in the post-Cold War era, policy makers are "trying to simply slide a looser foundation, the new international order, underneath old buttresses" in the form of well-established alliances. As Kosovo demonstrates, this old approach will not work. First, the U.S. is no longer completely in charge – "calling the shots" – and setting the "shared" vision and agenda for others to follow. Second, the established "script" of a well-defined threat and overwhelming U.S. force is no longer certain. It may not be clear in the end who wins and who loses. In short, the Cold War alliance system, with its bipolar-based organizations and procedures just may not be relevant.

2015: STRATEGIC APPRAISAL

How you think about the future influences what you think about the future, and ultimately what you do about the future.

— General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. 40

It is a reasonable assumption that despite strategic uncertainty, many factors will remain constant for the United States over the next ten to fifteen year period. The United States will continue to be a military, political, and economic superpower, and the enduring national values and interests depicted in Figure 3, will remain constant. Global stability and security are paramount to achieving the interest of a favorable world order, and thus "durable relationships with our allies and friendly nations [will remain] vital to [U.S.] security." No traditionally-defined single nation state will be capable of challenging the U.S. in all elements of power as a peer competitor. However, this does not guarantee a stable and secure world. If the past ten years are a guide for the next ten, humanitarian crises and regional conflicts along ethnic, religious, and cultural lines will persist. "Aspiring" regional powers and transnational organizations that can asymmetrically challenge U.S. conventional military superiority will most likely complicate this situation. It is appropriate and necessary therefore, to return to the model for strategy formulation (Figure 2) and attempt to codify a feasible strategic appraisal for the next 10-15 years. The challenge is to strike a balance between existing expensive and unwieldy multinational security arrangements while confronting rising instability in regions where the U.S. has important interests. Determining a coherent national strategy to offset the challenges hinges on understanding future trends.

CHALLENGES TO U.S. INTERESTS

An analysis of the challenges to U.S. interests includes the categories of forces/trends, opportunities, and threats. It is inherently difficult to predict the future with any degree of accuracy. In 1985, few if any policymakers could foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union, military operations in Panama and Iraq, the fiasco in Somalia, and the intensity of the eruption of violence in the Balkans. There is evidence of a strong correlation between the rise of regional instability and the demise of the Soviet threat. While not a direct threat to the survival of the United States, regional instability significantly hampers the ability of the U.S. to achieve its global interests. While alliances were instrumental in the Cold War strategy, they do not appear to be either effective or efficient in fashioning a favorable world order in their current configuration.

Changes in geopolitics and technology are two forces that significantly contribute to instability. While certainly not peaceful, a bipolar world was comparatively stable. In its wake, regional conflicts have sprung up along points of cultural intersection. In the areas that adjoin these points, significant differences in culture, religion, ethnicity, and ideology are present, raising the probability of conflict. Cold War geopolitics either suppressed internal conflict (as in the case of the Soviet Union) or kept it from escalating to armed direct confrontation between the superpowers. As the 21st century begins, Eurasia (specifically areas surrounding the Balkans and southern Russia), Northeast Asia, and the Middle East —

all areas of strategic importance to the United States – are ripe for armed conflict. In less than five years, the disappearance of a checking mechanism (such as the superpower confrontation) has transformed 40 years of status quo geopolitics. Although the U.S. remains actively engaged in mutual security alliances or arrangements on the periphery of these cultural intersection points, global engagement has not checked the rise of primordial violence on a scale unfamiliar to most Westerners. In the Balkans, where there was no direct aggression against one of its members, NATO's response to date is dubious at best.

The other significant force affecting regional stability is technology. Extremely rapid advances in information technology and computerization are changing the means of warfare, in what some term a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Stealth platforms with enhanced situational awareness deliver precision standoff munitions with a Circular Error Probable of less than one meter. Although highly touted in the media, these are of limited use against a low-tech, but cunning adversary. The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) worked well against Serbian infrastructure, but not directly against the forces carrying out the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. In Chechnya, tactics employed recently by the Chechen rebels effectively negated a Russian firepower advantage in that conflict. In these smaller scale regional conflicts, trends do not support the Desert Storm warfighting paradigm. The low-tech adversary adapts his means and ways to asymmetrically negate the opponent's technological advantage. One of his essential weapons is time; the U.S. does not have a propensity for prolonged conflict, especially when important interests are not at stake. As a hedge against a future Major Theater War (MTW) where interests are at stake, it is clear that the U.S. intends to continue developing weapons systems that exploit the evolving technology. It is also just as clear that many U.S. allies - particularly in NATO - have no such intention, citing both costs and questionable military necessity. An interoperability gap is developing between the U.S. and the NATO allies that may prove extremely problematic in future multinational operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. 42 As doctrine, organizations, and equipment diverge, it becomes increasingly difficult to collectively define and achieve common ends. Therefore, it is important to exploit opportunities to enhance stability in regions where the U.S. has vital and important interests. Stability offsets the requirement to resolve differences using military forces, especially if the probability of successful military intervention is significantly lower.

There are numerous opportunities associated with multinational operations which, if properly executed, have the potential to enhance stability and security at these points of cultural intersection. On such example is the continued expansion of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Through measured application, the PfP program has increased the democratization of former Warsaw Pact armies without directly threatening Russian interests in Eurasia. In addition, it has facilitated NATO's eastward enlargement helping to stabilize democratic reforms in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic while increasing the buffer against conflicts to the east. As the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) continues to mature as a separate entity from NATO, it has the potential to contribute significantly to enhancing stability in Europe. The OSCE oversaw the 1996 national and 1997 municipal elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and has established official missions in Kosovo, the newly independent

republics of the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere in the Balkans.⁴³ If nothing else, the OSCE provides a uniquely-European, non-military forum for helping Europe solve its own security problems.

In the Middle East, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has demonstrated progress, albeit not without tribulations, in the areas of mutual economic cooperation and industrial diversification. If these positive trends continue, social development and increased political stability should result. 44 The United States has engaged the GCC to seek ways to enhance collective security against the two possible regional hegemons, Iran and Iraq, through forums such as the 1991 Damascus Declaration. Recent events in Iran show promise for that nation's eventual evolution towards moderation. However, as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power in Iraq, the region will be far from stable. The Middle East presents another unique stability challenge with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their delivery means. While this global threat warrants separate consideration below, it appears the "coin of the realm" in the Middle East is deterrence from an attack by possessing an equal or greater counterforce capability, reminiscent of the U.S. - USSR Cold War standoff. It is highly unlikely that a Middle East mutual defense alliance involving the United States would ever come to fruition largely based on Arab and Western cultural and religious differences. It is also highly speculative whether the United States could form and sustain another Desert Storm-like coalition to militarily contain a regional hegemon like Iraq. For the mid-term, given the linkage between Middle East oil and the world economy, the U.S. will continue to have vital interests in this region. U.S. limited-presence forces are the only current substitute for a mutual security organization that simultaneously enhances stability and advances U.S. interests in the region.

Northeast Asia presents a unique challenge for the United States based not only on historically deep-rooted cultural/ethnic rivalries, but also perhaps most importantly, on the role of China in the region. It is far too early to assess the eventual impact or role of what many view as the next likely peer competitor will have, or the path the Chinese will follow. With its large population and enormous geographical size, at a minimum China will be a regional economic and political force. The potential for direct military confrontation between China and the U.S. over the sensitive issue of Taiwan's demands for independence warrants vigilance. For the near to mid-term, the U.S. will have to continue to rely on existing bilateral agreements with Japan and South Korea to maintain military influence in this economically important region.

The final factor in the strategic appraisal process is an examination of most likely (versus all possible) future threats to U.S. interests. Future threats run the gamut in significance, complexity, and diversity. Additionally, no single threat appears likely to place the survival of the United States as a nation with its essential institutions intact at risk for the next fifteen years. Each threat is capable of fomenting extreme instability on certainly a regional, if not global basis. Among the most commonly cited examples are South American and Central Asian narco-trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means; civil wars; terrorism; Russia's handling of the Caucasus, Baltic Republics, and the Nordic countries; and Islamic fundamentalism.⁴⁵ Although the impacts and effects of many of these

threats could have global reach (such as loose controls over Russia's nuclear assets) most are primarily of regional significance.

With few exceptions (such as interdiction of Middle East oil supplies, or the security of Israel,) instability rarely threatens a vital U.S. national interest. However, inaction towards a regional crisis/conflict has the potential to escalate that crisis to one with global implications, particularly if it expands beyond national or continental borders. In conflicts motivated by religion, ethnicity, or cultural reasons (versus national sovereignty) the threat of U.S. military intervention may not be an effective deterrent. It is unlikely one regional alliance would willingly come to the aid of another U.S. ally in a completely different region. Absent a monolithic threat (such as communism,) alliances will likely remain regionally as opposed to globally focused. As manifested in the Balkans however, consensus among members of a regional alliance (particularly when objectives differ) on the best collective course of action is often difficult to achieve.

In Eurasia, the threat is less from a resurgent Russia seeking its rightful place in balance of power geopolitics, than from the lingering effects of the breakup of the former Soviet Union and Russia's ultimate attempt to hold its former empire together. This subregion also contains a sizeable amount of known oil reserves, which a cash-strapped Russia could sorely use to solve a portion of its economic problems. However, corporations with the technical expertise to extract the oil are unwilling to do so due to the civil unrest and the probability of terrorist attacks against any oil pipeline. This largely Muslim area is rife with ethnic and culturally based civil wars. The possibility of rising Islamic fundamentalism on Russia's southern rim encouraging wars for independence poses a significant threat for regional stability. The chance for spillover of local conflicts into neighboring countries (similar to the situation previously addressed with Kosovo) bears watching. Turkey, a NATO ally and an Islamic nation is located less than 500 kilometers southwest of the fighting. Regional instability where the U.S. has no vital interests has the potential to end up as a requirement for U.S. or NATO intervention in accordance with the Alliance charter. Given NATO's track record in resolving similar types of conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo, it is circumspect to believe NATO would be capable of much more than simply terminating the fighting in any such conflict.

The Caucasus region is critical to Russia's interests, and one small-scale shooting war is not the only problem in this region. Collectively, unrest in the Caucasus region contributes to increased crime, a host of economic, and political/social problems. Russia has not shown a propensity for recognizing the independence of these republics (especially Chechnya) out of concern that they might become staging bases for exporting violence further into Russia. There are larger security implications if a Caucasus conflict spreads, for example into the Middle East or into Eurasia where a NATO ally (Turkey) and many of the PfP nations are located. Additionally, the Russian response to world reaction (which has been noticeably restrained thus far) regarding conflict spillover and the possible resulting humanitarian crisis is unpredictable. Just because the Soviet Union dissolved in 1990 it does not mean that Russia has no role in Eurasian power politics. It is an enormous country bordering many of the cultural intersection points

addressed earlier. It is too early to predict how this situation will play out, but it is clearly one where the effectiveness of a traditional military alliance or coalition in response would be questionable. Again, while this situation does not threaten vital U.S. interests, the United States has demonstrated in the past a willingness (Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo) to intervene when and where less than vital interests were threatened.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means have the potential to threaten the survival of the United States as a nation. However, with the WMD threat, capability does not automatically equate to intent to use. It would require a nation with intercontinental missiles to threaten the U.S. mainland, and the intent and expertise to package an effective nuclear, biological, or chemical warhead. Currently 35 nations possess ballistic missiles ⁴⁶. Besides the five major nuclear powers, only six nations (India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia) have missiles with ranges in excess of 1000km (a traditional threshold for strategic differentiation.) Two are U.S. friends/allies; the remaining four nations appear to possess these missiles in response to specific regional interests (i.e. India vs. Pakistan, Iran-Middle East hegemony, and North Korea – probably domination of the Korean Peninsula versus Northeast Asia hegemony.) In short, the overwhelming majority of nations with ballistic missiles possess the shorter-range versions that are more suited to use in regional conflicts. Given existing security arrangements and forward-presence operations however, the U.S. has the capability today (and continues to develop future systems) to counter this threat. Although it is known that North Korea is (and will continue to be) a proliferator of long-range missile technology, a direct attack against the continental United States is not in North Korea's interest for the foreseeable future.

The remaining threats are likewise regional in nature, and while it is possible to counter them with military forces, the military element of national power should not necessarily be the first one employed. None directly threatens the existence of the United States, but these types of threats are the most prolific in disrupting a peaceful and stable world order. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute tracks large-scale violent conflicts, and currently identifies 30 in progress – all of which started as domestic, internal wars. There are at least 11 civil wars occurring in Africa, and all the current conflicts in the former Soviet Union and Balkans regions started as "communal conflicts." These tend to be clustered in areas where colonial empires collapsed (Africa) and on the periphery of the former Soviet Union where a legitimate government regime, state infrastructures, etc. were lacking. There are certain parallels between these situations and post-World War II in Europe and Japan. The Marshall Plan was enormously successful in creating the conditions that allowed these nations to recover economically under the U.S. security umbrella. A similar approach, funded and administered by competent regional authorities/organizations deserves consideration.

STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES

Given these forces, trends, and threats facing the United States, is a strategy of global engagement and reliance on multinational military arrangements the nation's best choice for the first decade of the 21st century? Traditionally, analysts posit four possible strategies ranging from neo-

isolationism to U.S. primacy (global hegemony). These two polar extremes are not suitable or acceptable national strategies given the current nature of the international environment. The U.S. cannot absorb the opportunity cost associated with complete withdrawal to "fortress America". Likewise, without a clear threat/peer competitor, domestic politics will limit resources required for U.S. global preeminence. Between these two are the strategies of "selective engagement" and "cooperative security." The fundamental differences between realism and idealism emerge clearly in the two strategic options. The table below lists the salient characteristics of each.

CHARACTERISTIC	"SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT"	"COOPERATIVE SECURITY"
Preferred World Order	Balance of Power	Interdependence
Major International Problem	Peace Among the Major Powers	Interdependence
National Interests	Restricted	Transnational
Regional Priorities	Industrial Eurasia *	Global
NATO	Maintain	Transform/Expand
Regional Conflicts	Contain/Discriminate Intervention **	Intervene
Ethnic Conflicts	Contain	Nearly Indiscriminate Intervention
Humanitarian Intervention	Discriminate Intervention	Nearly Indiscriminate Intervention
Use of Force	Discriminate	Frequent
Required Military Forces	Two Major Regional Conflicts	Recon/Strike complex for
		multilateral action

TABLE 1. SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY STRATEGIES⁴⁸

The military aspects of these two strategies differ in their basic approach to alliances and coalitions. In "selective engagement," the U.S. would maintain the traditional alliances in which it is currently involved. In "cooperative security," international agencies such as the United Nations or regional organizations would coordinate any collective response to aggression. This has implications for Eurasia and the Middle East where the possible threats discussed previously, pose the most danger to U.S. interests. In these regions, it is difficult to imagine many nations, especially the United States, relinquishing responsibility for its collective security to the United Nations or other international organizations in their current configuration. Both strategic options require policy makers to accept a degree of risk, given the lack of absolute clarity in the strategic environment. Risk is a function of insufficient means to achieve the desired or stated ends. The "selective engagement" option takes this ends-means dynamic into account, and dictates a measured application of national power given a restricted set of national interests to reduce the chances of becoming over-committed. Through rigorous

^{*} The Middle East remains a core security interest due to the great powers' reliance on oil. The region has both economic and military considerations if one power attempts to exercise total control of this vitally important resource.

^{**} The terms discriminate/discriminate intervention appear frequently in response to ethnic/cultural conflicts and humanitarian crises. Posen and Ross define this as intervention to reduce the risk of inciting a great powers war, or to counter unilateral intervention by another great power.

analysis of interests and options, policy makers must determine when and where to intervene. Risk increases when initially stable situations begin to deteriorate. The "art" of strategy may require difficult decisions when national interests are threatened, even if only peripherally. Conversely, "cooperative security" mitigates high risk decisions about when and where to apply national power, since an indiscriminate U.S. response is the norm in any crisis or conflict on a global basis. The obvious risk comes from insufficient means to achieve the idealistic ends the strategy dictates. Finally, the near automatic propensity of the U.S. to intervene in regional, ethnic, or humanitarian conflicts in the "cooperative security" strategy would have to come at the expense of the domestic political agenda. Given the lack of a likely peer military competitor in the next fifteen years, the only viable strategic option is maintenance of the status quo, which is Selective Engagement.

Selective Engagement accommodates the constraint on the reduction of military forces prevalent in current alliance structures. Additionally, it lessens the tendency to default automatically to the military element of power in selected Military Operations Other Than War involving humanitarian and ethnic conflicts. The current National Security Strategy of global engagement technically does not. This is not to suggest that the U.S. should withdraw from its international commitments; in fact, doing so is the basis of the infeasible isolationist strategy. Twentieth century European history is obvious proof that when the U.S. has not been a part of the balance of power, the world is indeed a very dangerous place. Rather, the U.S. should execute the strategy precisely as titled – selectively.

To this end, the noted futurist Alvin Toffler has proposed a concept of "deep coalitions" well suited to Operations Other Than War. In regions deemed not critical to national interests, the United States could avoid engagement, confident that a tailored "deep coalition," preferably from the region involved ultimately will have the capability to solve the problem and be less constrained by time. These coalitions could draw on a range of resources including Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), and nations from the affected region. It is currently rare to integrate private sector resources into OOTW, despite their ability to assist in operations hampered by a lack of governmental infrastructure. Although they can exacerbate conflict, many large multinational corporations (especially mining and oil companies for example) often have a large potential stake in the region, can wield enormous influence with the remnants of the government and the parties to the conflict, and perhaps most importantly can provide the employment opportunities essential during the rehabilitation phase. Military forces may play a role, but it should be a minor one, especially in humanitarian, ethnic, and cultural conflicts. Not only do they lack specialized training for these operations, but long-term commitment of military forces detracts from their primary warfighting mission and results in a huge resource drain in order to sustain them.

The friction between realist versus idealist inclinations on the national level creates a policy conundrum for the United States. For this reason, it embodies the modern Melian Dialogue. A national strategy that adopts a full cooperative security approach represents the Melian "idealist" solution. Conversely, the selective engagement option (if executed selectively), coupled with a recognition of the

power of attenuated alliances and multinational "deep coalitions", represents the Athenian "realist" position. The true worth of alliances and coalitions can be measured in terms of how well they allow the United States to husband its national power (political, economic, and military) without the additional "baggage" of purely idealist security ventures. The neo-isolationism and primacy strategic options are clearly infeasible from the realistic perception of attempting to arrive at a calculated balance between ends and means. Effective multinational alliances and coalitions can enhance regional stability through deterrence, and respond to terminate conflicts or alleviate humanitarian crises that do arise. With the proper structure and capabilities, alliances and coalitions can provide a degree of cooperative synergism to a realistic national strategy of selective engagement.

IMPLICATIONS FOR A FUTURE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.

— Michael Howard "Military Science in an Age of Peace" 50

The answer to the initial question, namely, what foreign policy role can multinational military alliances and coalitions (involving the U.S.) perform in the post-Cold War strategic environment is extremely complex. Due to the high degree of uncertainty precipitated by rapid changes in both the geostrategic environment and technology, as well as the absence of a peer threat necessitates both an objective and subjective assessment of the measures of effectiveness.

U.S. enduring core interests will not change in the next fifteen years. National policy, and the supporting security and military strategies must base their objectives on protecting these interests from a diverse set of emerging threats. From those objectives, a thorough analysis of the means available will determine whether the specific requirement for alliances.

Five criteria form the basis of assessing the threat to U.S. interests. Those are time, geographic proximity, magnitude, infectiousness, and connectivity. In theory, policy makers would establish a threshold of acceptable risk, and a set of triggering events would dictate the requirement to respond. While many of the identified threats have the potential to rapidly escalate and threaten a vital national interest, none warrant an immediate response today based on the five criteria. As a result, the United States can selectively engage as appropriate with all elements of national power, more to favorably shape the future than counter an insignificant (in accordance with the objective analysis) threat. This is the essence of employing a national strategy of Selective Engagement. The key is applying the proper element of power, or combination of elements, at the required intensity to achieve effect within the correct time horizon. Military power may be immediately available (time) but may not be the most suitable element of national power in the given situation.

The logical conclusion is that the United States must remain engaged and committed in the two regions – the Middle East and Eurasia – where vital national interests play a central role in the strategic equation. The Middle East is vital because the disruption of the free flow of oil has the potential to create significant repercussions for the free markets of the global economy (specifically our allies.) It is difficult to ascertain the level of control Russia exercises over its remaining nuclear assets, and what their precise intent is for these weapons. Given the high degree of regional instability and the inability to foresee accurately the eventual outcomes, Eurasia must therefore remain a critical region for U.S. engagement.

Unfortunately, the United States lacks mutual security alliances in either of these two regions. If limited-presence forces are attacked, or a threat emerges to the vital interests in these regions, the U.S. (for all intents and purposes) is on its own. Therefore, the policy to act alone in response to a threat, if it is in the national interest to do so, remains viable. As stated previously, it is highly unlikely that an

opportunity will present itself to forge a long-term military alliance in either of these regions. The lack of common interests and shared purpose poses an insurmountable hurdle to overcome.

It is possible to objectively assess the performance of at least the NATO military alliance in this changed security environment. Regardless of noble motives and intent, the lack of a shared vision, purpose, and threat in the Balkans hampered an effective Alliance response. While the European allies were initially agreeable to following the U.S. lead in attempting to resolve the conflicts in both Bosnia and Kosovo, their support was tepid at best. There was no consensus on end state, and the integrated command structure demonstrated a lack of flexibility to adapt to Operations Other Than War. It is highly improbable, due to significant ethnic and cultural differences, that a Middle East alliance in this environment could even begin to approach NATO's dismal record.

Does that logically lead to the conclusion that the U.S. should abandon its alliances? The answer is an equivocal "no." Alliances in both Europe and Northeast Asia were extremely effective in checking communist expansion for over forty years. The fundamental nature of existing mutual security treaties mandates U.S. participation, and it would be foolish to abandon that responsibility. In addition, history is absolutely clear on the consequences (particularly in Europe) when the U.S. disengages from the balance of power equation. The same is true for the Middle East; without U.S. resolve to protect national and allied interests, some nation or transnational group (Iraq today, tomorrow?) will attempt to establish hegemony. The strategic future of Russia and China, both extremely powerful in at least one element of national power, is unpredictable. At a minimum, mutual security agreements between the U.S. and current allies provide some form of check against potential expansionist tendencies on the part of either China or Russia. Existing alliances may not be effective or efficient in responding to regional instability, but they do play a key role in the current balance of power calculations. It would require a deliberate and conscious decision on the part of an aggressor to directly threaten U.S. interests or allies.

In the not too distant past, the U.S. Army hypothesized that given the training, equipment, and organizations to fight two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars, the capabilities would more than cover any less extensive contingency. Operations since Desert Storm have not proven the hypothesis to be true. Nevertheless, since the fundamental purpose of the U.S. armed forces remains to fight and win the nation's wars, a powerful military element of power is also a great hedge against future risk. In times of peace, military forces simultaneously serve as the ultimate demonstration of U.S. resolve to protect its interests. Two additional aspects are also painfully clear. It is unlikely that the domestic political agenda will willingly free resources to permit the military to prepare for a peer threat that will not emerge for at least the next fifteen years. Second, humanitarian crises, regional instability, and ethnic/cultural/religious conflicts will continue to proliferate. Individually, they may never directly threaten U.S. interests. However, indirectly they will diffuse the nation's ability to respond unless policy makers abandon the status quo policy of indiscriminate intervention and rigorously implement a national strategy of Selective Engagement. Modifying those areas identified in the alliance model (figure 5), multinational operations

can have a positive effect on resolving the current disparity between ends and means. The solution lies in adopting the "deep coalition" concept.

Military forces from nations who share regional interests, culture, and ethnicity must comprise an essential component of "deep coalitions." In certain operations, military forces will take the lead; in others, they enable political or economic initiatives. At times, U.S. armed forces will participate when it is in the national interest to do so, or when only the United States can supply the critical means to satisfactorily achieve the ends. The important point here is that the decision to participate is selective (not automatic) and only when it is in the interests of the United States to do so. The decision to lead or support depends on the situation. The recent operations in East Timor demonstrate it is far easier to formulate a U.S. exit strategy and end state, yet still provide allies with critical resources, when another nation is in charge. In NATO, where the U.S. is clearly the leader of the Alliance, the ability to extract military forces or reduce the level of effort is clearly difficult. It is also probable that regionally-based military forces with compatible interests and shared cultural aspects will be more successful in resolving a crisis. This enhances the process of restoring stability without threatening the regional balance of power through overwhelming U.S. commitment. As a triggering event in one of the five threat assessment factors occurs, U.S. participation correspondingly increases. Existing regional alliances must be able to furnish suitable and acceptable forces for these stability missions.

Maintaining alliance relationships provides the U.S. with two additional benefits. First, alliances provide a collective forum for developing future military concepts and identifying required capabilities to respond to "over the horizon" threats. There is minimal guesswork involved in determining what an ally is doing with their militarily forces. An intangible aspect of this arrangement is the ability of individual nations (with differing levels of resources) to substantively and equitably contribute means towards the alliance's collective ends. If executed in a controlled environment, this provides an internal checking mechanism against any one nation becoming overly preponderant to the point its capabilities challenge U.S. interests. The second benefit is enhanced interoperability. Not all the member nations in existing alliances will ever be able to match the U.S. technology and industrial bases. Minimizing redundant requirements (i.e. for individual, vice collective defense) results in enhanced interoperability and synergy as each ally provides some critical function to achieve the desired collective effects. Situational force tailoring becomes feasible when the time ultimately comes to mount a collective response to counter a threat anywhere on the conflict spectrum. This may not be the perfect solution to current alliance shortcomings, but it is far more palatable than ignoring the real and growing interoperability gap or trying to sustain a strategy of indiscriminate global engagement. No single solution is perfect. However, it is quite clear from recent examples that many changes are necessary.

The United States lacks sufficient military resources to sustain its current defacto policy of indiscriminate global intervention in every crisis or conflict that erupts. Intervening where no vital or important interest is at stake creates and sustains a "no-win" situation where limited resources are expended without achieving the desired objective (ends – means mismatch.) The resulting operations

and personnel tempo have come close to breaking the force. At a minimum, conventional readiness to perform the primary mission is questionable. At the same time, alliances rooted in Cold War methodologies fractionalize because their basic operating paradigms are not suited for the new situation that confronts them.

"Deep coalitions" represent the realistic, but feasible Athenian variant to the traditional alliances and coalitions that cannot be sustained in the post-Cold War environment facing the United States. They permit policy makers to avoid the pitfalls associated with an historical gravitation towards either isolationism or global primacy. Deep coalitions may not be the perfect solution, nevertheless they provide the bridge between the idealistic extreme of cooperative security and the realism of selective engagement. Until the geo-strategic environment sorts itself out, they do provide one solution that is "about right" for the challenges of the early 21st century.

WORD COUNT = 10,837

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Thucydides, <u>The Peloponnesian War</u>, translated by Rex Warner (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books Inc., 1954), 402.
- George Washington, "Farewell Address", 17 September 1796; available from wysiwyg://7/http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/gw1/speeches/gwfar.htm; Internet; accessed 2 January 2000.
- ³ Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations</u>, Joint Publication 3-16 (Draft) (Washington, D.C.: Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), I-1, Course 4 Readings, Volume III.
 - 4 Ibid.
 - 5 Ibid.
- William S. Cohen, <u>Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense</u>: A Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 1999), II-9.
 - ⁷ Appendix 1 to AY 2000 Course 2 ["War, National Policy, and Strategy"] Course Directive, 147-154.
- ⁸ William J. Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy for a New Century</u> (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 1988). 5. Hereafter referred to as Clinton.
 - 9 Ibid.,2 (emphasis added.)
- William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 1997), 9.
 - ¹¹ Ibid., 11.
- John M. Shalikashvili, <u>National Military Strategy of the United States of America</u> (Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), 12.
 - ¹³ Ibid., 13.
 - ¹⁴ Ibid., 15.
- ¹⁵ While this list of national values is ultimately derived from the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States, an excellent source article is Lawrence, J.R. Herson, "The American Political Culture: Do's and Don'ts of Political Life," in <u>The Politics of Ideas: Political Theory and American Public Policy</u>, 13-26 (USAWC Course 2 Readings, Volume 1B).
 - ¹⁶ Derived from Clinton, 5.
 - ¹⁷ Ibid., 1.
 - ¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Derived from Clinton, 8-24.

²⁰ Derived from Shalikashvili, 2-4, 22-23.

²¹ "Harry S. Truman," Encarta Encyclopedia (1997 edition).

²² In April 1948, Louis St. Laurent proposed the idea of a single mutual defense system including the Brussels Treaty signatories and the North American democracies in the Canadian House of Commons. Simultaneously, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R, MI) proposed the Vandenberg Resolution before the U.S. Senate on 11 June 1948. The resolution stated while U.S. policy was to work through the newly created United Nations (then just three years old itself), the U.S. should be determined to exercise the right of collective self defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter – a provision that was written into Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Vandenberg was the U.S. delegate at the founding conference of the United Nations, and was chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at the time the resolution was proposed.

²³ For a detailed discussion of NATO's origins and founding, see <u>The NATO Handbook</u>, (Brussels, Belgium: Office of Information and Press, 1998), 25-27.

Historians and scholars point to Secretary of State Dean Acheson's January 12, 1950 National Press Club Speech, in which he excluded Korea from the American defense perimeter as evidence of the absence of an American commitment to defend South Korea if attacked. In At a Century's Ending, George Kennan cites the growth of a strong feeling in the American military and political establishments in early 1950 that the U.S. would have to garrison Japan for an indefinite period even if it meant concluding a separate Japanese peace treaty that the Russians did not agree to. Kennan states that "if Japan was to remain indefinitely a bastion of American military power, if there was to be no agreed peace settlement for Japan, and if Moscow was to have no look-in on the Japanese situation, then Moscow wanted by way of compensation, to consolidate is military-political position in Korea – an area we appeared not to care much about in any case." (pp. 94-95)

²⁵ "Central Treaty Organization," Encarta Encyclopedia (1997 edition).

²⁶ Matthew White, "The Cold War"; available from http://users.erols.com; Internet; accessed 2 January 2000.

While the many accomplishments of the Desert Storm coalition are duly cited in <u>Conduct of the Persian Gulf War</u>, <u>Final Report to Congress</u>, April 1992, Appendix 1 of the report also notes that air and sealift (at that time) were inadequate to move enough coalition personnel/materiel far and fast enough (airlift is still a strategic mobility problem) and that "combined forces C2 is still rudimentary, IFF is inadequate." The fratricide of British ground forces by coalition aircraft, and if Israel had decided to respond to Iraqi SCUD launches against her major cities are two examples of situations that could have collapsed the coalition.

²⁸ "The West Versus Serbia," <u>The Economist</u> (March 27, 1999) 351, no.8112: 49. NATO's position was reiterated in the April 3, 1999 issue of <u>The Economist</u>, "Hope for the Best, and a Spot of Golf," 19.

²⁹ "War with Milosevic, A Widening Conflict," <u>The Economist</u> (April 10, 1999) 351, no.8114: 21.

³⁰ "The Mixed Feelings of Europeans," The Economist (April 17, 1999) 351, no.8115: 54.

³¹ Ibid. 55.

- ³² Ibid. 54.
- ³³ Ibid. 53.
- ³⁴ "U.S. General was Overruled in Kosovo," New York Times, 10 September 1999, A6.
- ³⁵ Josef Joffe, "Where Germany Has Never Been Before," <u>The National Interest,</u> Summer 1999, no. 56: 50.
 - 36 Ibid. 48-49.
 - ³⁷ Ibid. Citing German Foreign Minister Josef Fisher.
 - ³⁸ Anne M. Dixon, "The Whats and Whys of Coalitions," <u>Joint Forces Quarterly</u>, Winter 1993-94, 27.
 - 39 Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ Gordon R. Sullivan, <u>Hope Is Not a Method</u>, citing General Franks in "America's Army, Focusing on the Future," a 1994 video production of the Department of the Army Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force.
 - 41 Clinton, 2.
- ⁴² David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, <u>Mind the Gap</u> (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999,) 5.
 - ⁴³ The NATO Handbook, 320.
- ⁴⁴ Abdullah J. Al-Haj, "A Gulf Citizen's Viewpoint of the Gulf Cooperation Council: A Critique," Journal of South Asia and Middle Eastern Studies, 22 (Summer 1999), no.4: 52.
- ⁴⁵ For an excellent and relatively thorough (although not exhaustive) discussion of threats relevant to the U.S. military, see <u>Military Review</u>, July-August 1999. The entire edition is devoted to future threats.
- ⁴⁶ Rodney W. Jones, <u>Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998</u> (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 263-4.
- ⁴⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr, "The Information Revolution and International Security," Center for Strategic & International Studies; available from http://www.csis.org/pubs; Internet, accessed 13 February 2000.
- ⁴⁸ Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategies," <u>International Security</u>, Vol 21, no.3, pp 5-53. Reprinted in USAWC Course 2 Readings, Vol 1A, 39-76.
- ⁴⁹ Karin von Hippel, "Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building," <u>The Washington Quarterly</u>; available from http://www.twg.com; Internet, accessed 13 February 2000. Ms. Hipple's article appeared in the Winter 2000 edition; she is currently serving as the civil affairs officer for the United Nations Mission in Kosovo.
- ⁵⁰ Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," [Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture given on 3 Oct 1973] <u>Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies</u>, March 1974, 119, no. 1: 7.

⁵¹ Robert D. Blackwill, "A Taxonomy for Defining US National Security Interests in the 1990s and Beyond," reprinted in USAWC Course 2 Readings, Volume I-B, 298.

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